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The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations has among its objectives the "greater liberalization 
of trade in agriculture" and the inclusion of domestic agricultural policies "under strengthened and more 
operationally effective GATT Rules and Disciplines."  Negotiators have until December 1990 to fulfill 
this ambitious aim.  The major participants have tabled their "comprehensive proposals" on the content 
of the negotiations.  This report compares these proposals to see if common ground exists which would 
allow for a satisfactory outcome of the negotiations. 
All the current proposals from the Cairns Group, the European Community, Japan, the Nordic 
Countries  and the United States  emphasize the need  for  an  integrated package of measures.  Such a 
package would address the issues of import access, export subsidies and restrictions, domestic subsidies 
that  distort  trade,  and  the  differences  in  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  regulations  that  act  as  trade 
impediments.  To the US and the Cairns Group, such integration can best be achieved by ensuring that 
action is taken on each of these fronts.  To the EC, balance is better left to domestic policy decisions, 
with international negotiations focussing on the overall level of support given by border and domestic 
measures.  A reasonable compromise would suggest that specific policy instruments be disciplined within 
an overall objective of support reduction. 
On import access, the main issues involve the proposal by the US,  also favored by the Cairns 
Group,  for conversion to  tariffs of import barriers such as  variable levies and quotas.  The European 
Community has proposed a modified form of tariffication which would fix  a part of the variable levy. 
Canada has suggested that quantitative import controls be kept if domestic production is also controlled. 
The EC  wants  to  be allowed  to  increase some  import barriers as  a way  of rebalancing  its  domestic 
markets,  and Japan would like to exempt some import restrictions on food  security grounds.  Though 
agreement will be difficult in this area, a move toward tariffication could be an  important step toward 
more market orientation in domestic policies. 
The issue of export subsidies needs to be tackled if the Uruguay Round is to succeed.  The US 
proposal is to phase all such subsidies out over a five-year period, while the Cairns Group would allow 
somewhat more time to remove such subsidies.  The EC proposal does not mention explicit negotiations 
on export subsidy levels, preferring them to be reduced as support levels fall and as tariffs are cut.  But 
they agree that the "same arrangements" as hold for import access barriers could be applied to exports. 
This opens up  the possibility of a parallel move to  limit both import levies and  export subsidies if it 
proves impossible to remove such subsidies altogether. 
The problem of domestic subsidies shows up the same differences in approach between the main 
protagonists.  The US wishes to ban price-related ("red light") subsidies altogether while allowing trade-
neutral  ("green  light")  programs  to  continue.  The Cairns  Group  would  favor  the  same  process  of 
domestic policy reform which this would entail, but the EC argues for less restraints on domestic policy 
choice.  The solution to this dilemma may be to agree on a list of policies that are less disruptive to trade 
and to encourage their use, at the same time negotiating down the level of support given by other policies-
-whether or not those policies could eventually be banned. 
On  the  question of Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  Regulations  considerable agreement  has  been 
reached on the need to  strengthen GATT rules  and  procedures, to  encourage the use of international 
standards, and to agree that "sound scientific evidence" should be used to avoid protectionist use of  health 
regulations.  Differences still exist on the best method of accomplishing this. Countries are also broadly in accord on the need to allow developing countries more time to adopt 
such new obligations, and the EC proposes further assistance to countries that may be adversely effected 
by world price increases arising from liberalization.  Though the details remain to be worked out, the 
issue of "special and differential treatment" for developing countries should not be a stumbling block. 
More likely to remain an issue to the end is the "special" treatment that Japan seeks, to be allowed 
to preserve its range of  policies on sensitive products on grounds that these involve "non-trade concerns. " 
Along with the EC's desire to see "rebalancing" in its own oilseed and cereals market, this issue could 
best be handled by treating it as  "sui generis", rather than building such exceptional treatment into the 
rules of the GATT. 
The common ground is substantial, including the agreement by all major players to remove current 
waivers and exemptions; to reduce substantially the level of trade-distorting support; to move toward a 
form of tariffication on imports; to reduce if not remove export subsidies; to classify domestic subsidies 
so as to encourage the use of some and discourage others; to firm up rules dealing with health and safety 
standards; and to allow developing countries more time to meet these obligations. 
A satisfactory outcome, built on this common ground, could include a reduction in support of at 
least the same level' as that agreed for the tariff negotiations, achieved by a lowering of import barriers 
by that amount and a comparable reduction in export subsidies and in trade-distorting domestic subsidies. 
In addition to the reduction in support, a start would be made on the reinstrumentation of domestic and 
trade policies.  This would include a move toward tariffication and the ultimate elimination of export 
subsidies, together with the shift of domestic policies toward the use of more decoupled instruments of 
support.  Together with improvements in dispute settlement mechanisms and the clarification of GATT 
rules, such an agreement would contribute significantly to the success of  the Uruguay Round and represent 
a major achievement in improving the conditions for' agricultural trade. 
ii The Comprehensive Proposals for Negotiations in Agriculture 
I. Introduction 
The Uruguay Round of  GA'IT negotiations was launched in September 1986 with ambitious aims. 
Among these aims was the achievement of "greater liberalization of  trade in agriculture" and the inclusion 
of domestic agricultural policies that directly or indirectly affect trade in agriculture "under strengthened 
and more operational  I  y effective GA'IT rules and disciplines" .
1  The negotiators were given four years 
to complete this and other tasks.  By the end of 1987 initial proposals on the conduct of negotiations on 
agriculture had been tabled by the United States (US), the Cairns Group (CG), the European Community 
(BC), Japan, and the Nordic Countries.2  These proposals were the subject of discussion and elaboration 
throughout 1988, leading up the Mid-Term Meeting in Montreal in December of that year.  Agreement 
on the conduct of  the negotiations for agriculture proved elusive at Montreal, but a compromise was found 
in April 1989, allowing negotiators to proceed.
3  The remainder of 1989 was devoted to the preparation 
of "comprehensive proposals" by the major participants, in accordance with the timetable agreed in April. 
These comprehensive proposals will form the basis for the final phase of the negotiations during 1990. 
The Uruguay Round is  scheduled for completion by  December  1990,  when the final  package will be 
considered at a Ministerial meeting in Brussels. 
The International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IA  TRC) has established study groups 
to report on and contribute to progress in the Uruguay Round talks on agricultural trade.  Earlier IA TRC 
reports covered the initial phases of the negotiations.  This report considers the comprehensive proposals 
of the US, the EC, the Cairns Group, the Nordic Countries, and Japan, as they were presented at the end 
of 1989.
4  The objective is to compare the proposals to see what common ground exists; to suggest, in 
the light of that comparison, compromise positions which might lead to  an acceptable result;  and  to 
illustrate the scope for compromise by describing the major elements of a package of particular measures 
which might constitute a feasible and successful outcome to the agricultural component of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. 
A substantial amount of  common ground exists among the major proposals.  This common ground 
should be enough for a substantial outcome to the negotiations.  However, the different presentational 
J GATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept.  1986. 
2  The initial proposals are to be  found in: GATT, United Stales Proposalfor Negotiations on Agriculture, July 1987; GATT, 
Cairns Group Proposal to the Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Agriculture, October 1987; GATT, European Communities 
Proposal for Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture,  October 1987; GATT, Japanese Proposal for Negotiations on 
Agriculture, December 1987; and GATT, Proposal of  the Nordic Countries to the Negotiating Group on Agriculture, November 
1987. 1n addition, Canada, though a member of  the Cairns Group, tabled a paper "Canadian Views on the Negotiating Approach 
for Agriculture" in  October 1987. 
The Cairns Group includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, 1ndonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines,  Thailand,  and Uruguay.  The Nordic Countries comprise Finland,  Iceland,  Norway and Sweden. 
3  GATT, Mid-Term GATT Review, April 1989. 
-I The proposals are contained in thefollowing papers: GATT, Submission of  the United States on Comprehensive Long-Term 
Agricultural Reform, October 1989; GATT, Global Proposal of  the European Community on the Long-Term Objectives for the 
Multilateral Negotiation on Agricultural Questions, December 1989;  GATT, Comprehensive Proposalfor Long-Term Reform of 
Agricultural Trade,  Submission by the Cairns Group,  November 1989; GAIT, Submission of  the Nordic Countries on Some 
Elements in  a  Comprehensive Long-Term Agricultural Reform Program, December 1989; and GATT, Submission by Japan, 
November 1989. approaches and emphases taken by the major participants make this common ground less than obvious. 
The US, while stressing the need for an integrated package, divides the issues to be tackled into four 
categories: import access, export subsidies, domestic subsidies, and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. 
This reflects in part the desire to achieve specific and visible "success"  in removing trade barriers and 
improving the conditions in export markets.  The Cairns Group uses a similar categorization of issues, 
again reflecting an export orientation.  They insist that commitments to reduce trade-distorting support 
and protection be applied directly and uniformly to policies in each category.  The EC, by contrast, is 
less keen on the notion of  separate arrangements for import access and export subsidies, preferring to deal 
with these and domestic subsidies together under a general commitment to reduce support.  This approach 
has the advantage to the EC of retaining more flexibility for governments to choose the mix of policy 
instruments. 
These differences in large part reflect different means to the same end.  An agreement to reduce 
overall support and protection will necessarily translate into changes in domestic subsidies,  improved 
access for imports and restrictions on export subsidies.  By the same token,  agreement on improved 
import access and reduced  domestic and export subsidies is bound to result in a reduction in the level 
of protection  and  support  provided  by  national  farm  programs.  5  It would  be  unfortunate  if this 
presentational difference were to divert attention from the underlying concordance of purpose. 
This report seeks to find an explore the issues on which agreement might be reached.  It  does not 
dwell on deep-seated philosophical differences on the proper role of government which some claim are 
at  the root of trade problems in agriculture.  While such differences clearly exist (within as  well  as 
between countries), they are unlikely to be resolved in international negotiations.  Instead, the report starts 
from the premise that negotiators are trying in good faith to find a mutually acceptable solution to the 
problem of international rules for the conduct of agricultural trade. 
The report begins  with  a  discussion of the  integrated  approach  to agricultural  negotiations, 
followed by comparisons of the proposals in the areas of import access, export subsidies and domestic 
subsidies.  This is followed by a discussion of three other areas of negotiation: the issue of trade-related 
aspects of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations; the question of special and differential treatment of 
developing countries; and the concern with  "non-trade" aspects of national policies, particularly those 
involving environmental programs and food security.  A further section looks at links with other parts of 
the negotiations.  The report ends with a discussion of the common ground among the proposals.  The 
major elements of a more specific package, intended to  illustrate one possible outcome,  is contained in 
Annex 1:  Annex 2 contains an elaboration of the issue of modified tariffication. 
ll. Building an Integrated Package 
As agreed at the Mid-Term Review, the objective of the negotiations is  "to establish a fair and 
market-oriented agricultural trading system."  This is  to be achieved through commitments to  reduce 
domestic subsidies that distort trade by encouraging import substitution or expansion of exports,  by 
lowering  frontier  barriers  that  hinder  or  prevent  imports,  and  by  reducing  subsidies  to  exports. 
Agreement has  also  been  reached  in  the  Mid-Term  Review  to  negotiate  effective  GATT rules  and 
5  In practical terms, the three-way categorization of  the problem has already been agreed: the Mid-Term Review indicates 
that commitments should be negotiated to cover import access and both export and domestic subsidies.  As a resulJ, negotiations 
will continue to maintain these distinctions. 
2 disciplines which apply equally to all GA  17  members and commitments which encompass all internal and 
frontier measures that affect trade either directly or indirectly.  In other words, the negotiated package 
must deal broadly with all countries, all policy instruments and all commodities if a substantial result is 
to emerge. 
In presenting their proposals for such a comprehensive agricultural reform, the major negotiating 
countries have stressed the importance of integrating the various elements that are on the table.  Although 
there are differences over how the integration is to be sustained in the negotiation, the intent to do so is 
clear.  The United  States  calls  for  reform  in  four  areas,  import  access,  export subsidies,  domestic 
subsidies,  and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations,  which  "should be viewed as  integral parts of a 
comprehensive package."  The Cairns  Group  advocates  a  reform  process  that  is  "comprehensive, 
integrated and equitable,"  and mentions the same areas  as  does the US.  Conceptually, the European 
Community goes farthest in achieving this integration by proposing that commitments to reduce support 
and protection be made in terms of an aggregate measure of support (AMS).  All policy instruments are 
covered because they  are all  included  in  the AMS.  But the inclusiveness  of the AMS  also  allows 
flexibility by governments in the use of policy instruments, and hence could lead to a solution where 
certain aspects of domestic and trade policy were not affected. 
If the  AMS  is  to  serve as  an  integrating device,  it  may  need  to  be supplemented  by  other 
commitments.  Both the EC and Cairns Group envisage an AMS, either as part of a formal commitment 
or as a target and means of monitoring progress towards it.
6  However, the Cairns Group, because they 
wish to ensure that the overall commitment to changes in agricultural policies and trade arrangements are 
tangible, verifiable and legally binding, prefer the overall commitment to be expressed in terms of  changes 
to specific policies.  Hence, key commitments will need to be provided in specific policy terms and be 
subject to remedial actions to give governments the confidence to enter into meaningful concessions. 
The possibility of a substantial outcome from the negotiations will be enhanced if some form of 
aggregate commitments to  reduce support and  protection by an agreed amount could be agreed at the 
outset.  The first area of agreement should be the form and extent of commitments to substantially and 
progressively reduce support and protection.  Here the EC approach is the more explicit and could serve 
as an acceptable starting point.  For example, agreement could be reached on AMS reductions of  a certain 
magnitude over a five-year period on condition that a number of  key commitments are expressed in terms 
of specific policy changes, tariffs or rules.  The commitments could be reviewed mid-way through the 
transition period and possibly adjusted on the basis of negotiation provided the key  commitments are 
sustained.  This would establish target reductions to  be pursued in negotiating access barriers, export 
competition and internal subsidies that affect trade.  It should ensure that all significant trade-distorting 
policies are reduced and all major commodities entering world trade are covered.  Farm support programs 
that have little impact on trade could, of course, be continued and less trade-distorting policies could be 
introduced. 
An integrated package of Significant agricultural policy reforms is much more likely to emerge 
from the negotiations if it is based on an across-the-board commitment to reduce support and protection 
by an agreed amount over a negotiated period.  All agricultural waivers, derogations and country-specific 
exceptions  would  need  to  be included,  as  would  any  policies  affecting trade that are not specifically 
6  The US proposal, which envisages a much more limited role for an AMS,  is not specific on how to achieve the overall 
integration that is called for in  its proposaL 
3 provided for in GA17.  This comprehensive coverage would ensure that reductions apply to the more 
sensitive sectors of all  countries' agricultural and trade policies, a necessary condition if a substantial 
result is to emerge from the negotiations.  Commitments in terms of an AMS provide a framework for 
negotiating the individual parts of the final result, for verifying compliance with the obligation assumed, 
and provide the basis for monitoring policy developments in the future. 
ID. Import Access 
Providing improved and  assured access to import markets for efficient suppliers of goods and 
services is the quintessential objective of the GA 17. The improvement of import access for agricultural 
goods entering world trade by changing the level and form of border protection is a central focus of the 
GA17 negotiations on agriculture in the Uruguay Round.  However, greater access for imports is not only 
important for exporting countries, it also provides a means of reflecting international market conditions 
to producers and consumers in importing countries.  Moderation of the effects of surplus and scarcity is 
facilitated by encouraging internal adjustments to global market developments. 
Most barriers to access are put in place to protect and improve farm incomes.  Border protection 
results in higher prices to consumers, greater domestic production, lower consumption and,  of course, 
reduced imports.  It is clear that improving import access not only involves the lowering of restrictions 
at the border but also a reduction in the level of trade-distorting farm and  agro-industry subsidies that 
reduce trade by fostering import substitution.  This interrelationship between import barriers and internal 
farm support programs convinced governments that agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round must 
be concerned with both border measures  and  internal programs.  Hence,  the proposals on domestic 
subsidies are also an integral part of the issue of improving import access. 
Import Access in the Comprehensive Proposals 
The United States has adopted the most direct approach to improving access.  It proposes that all 
non-tariff import barriers (NTBs)  be converted to  bound tariffs  and  that these, together with  existing 
tariffs,  be reduced  over ten  years  to  zero  or low  levels.  For the transition period,  NTBs  could be 
replaced with tariff-rate quotas (with lower or zero tariffs for within-quota imports), and these quotas 
would be gradually expanded as  the over-quota tariffs decline.  A safeguard mechanism against import 
surges is also proposed during the transition.  Since it would be made redundant by tariffication, the US 
would eliminate the exceptional treatment accorded agriculture under Article XI:2  (c)  that allows for 
quantitative restrictions to protect effective supply management systems. 
The objectives of the comprehensive proposal of xe Cairns Group of exporting countries  are 
similar to those of the US.  They "favor,,7 the conversion of most NTBs to tariffs as part of an integrated 
process of  reform.  Specific commitments relating to policies and products are advocated to reduce access 
barriers (in parallel with reductions in internal farm supports and export subsidies).  The Cairns Group 
couxries support the use of global tariff quotas where necessary. Their objective is to reduce protection 
against competitive imports substantially and  to  integrate fully  trade in  agricultural products into  the 
GA 17  system.  In anticipation of the EC request for"  rebalancing" protection they add that there should 
7 This ambiguous word was deliberately chosen to accommodate the desire of  Canada to retain import quotas in support of 
its supply management programs. 
4 be "no  scope for  raising  the protection levels  for  any  product except under  carefully circumscribed 
safeguard provisions." 
In contrast, the EC approach to the long-term objective of a "more market oriented agricultural 
trading system" is progressively to reduce protection "to the extent necessary" to restore balance.  The 
reductions, to be expressed as support measurement units (SMUs), would encompass "all measures which 
have a real impact on the production decisions of farmers."  As these commitments to reduce protection 
would cover all frontier measures, such as quotas and variable levies, import access would be improved. 
Under the EC proposal the program of reductions is to be reviewed during the fourth year to determine 
the extent and rate for continuing reductions. 
The Community is willing to include a modified version of tariffication in the rules applying to 
access provided agricultural support and protection are dealt with together and inconsistencies between 
policies and sectors within agriculture can be resolved through rebalancing.  Since the EC also recognizes 
that domestic subsidies (such as deficiency payments) result in import substitution, it insists that a parallel 
treatment of domestic subsidies must accompany the conversion of import quotas, variable import levies 
and the activities of state trading agencies into tariffs.  However, the Community favors the retention of 
Article XI 2(  c) of the GAIT, possibly in anticipation of the need to retain the right to restrict imports if 
the Common Agricultural Policy were to make greater use of supply controls. 
The approach of the Nordic countries is  broadly consistent with the EC proposal, calling for 
gradual reduction in agricultural support "as a catalyst for improved world markets."  They also advocate 
use of an  aggregate measure of support to guide the reform process with  commitments expressed  as 
specific policy changes.  They give some support to tariffication, arguing that border protection should 
be lowered  and  quantitative restrictions converted to  other mechanisms  such  as  tariffs.  The Nordic 
countries also support the use of safeguard mechanisms to avoid endangering  "essential policy goals." 
They envisage a continuation of  variable levies but under stronger disciplines that reduce the gap between 
domestic and world prices. 
Japan's basic position on import access stresses the importance of negotiating strong trade rules, 
but  argues  that  such  rules  should  take  into  account  the  special  nature of agriculture  and  non-trade 
concerns, particularly food security.  In particular, it is  proposed that border restraints taken for food 
security reasons be allowed.  Japan agrees that all barriers to access  should be subject to precise and 
consistently applied rules and disciplines, and proposes the treatment of  agriculture under Article XI:2(c) 
should be clarified.  However, most of  Japan's proposals would permit greater use of import restrictions 
and  considerable  flexibility  to  maintain  domestic  subsidies,  regardless  of their  effects  on  efficient 
exporters' access to the importers' markets. 
A number of  developing importing countries have expressed views relating to food security similar 
to those expressed by Japan.  In addition, many of them have stressed the principle of differential and 
more favorable treatment for developing countries in the policy reform process, including the need for 
longer transition periods, lower cuts in barriers to access, and greater flexibility in the conduct of national 
agricultural policies.  The net food importing developing countries are seeking assistance through both 
trade and non-trade means to strengthen their food situations and their rural economies, and some of the 
policies they favor would tend to limit access to their markets. 
5 Differences and Similarities 
The main differences between the approach on import competition taken by the United States and 
the Cairns Group countries on one hand and Japan (and many developing countries) on the other is the 
extent to which the international market should be allowed to influence imports and determine internal 
agricultural prices decisions.  The European Community openly questions the acceptability of world 
market signals and free trade in agricultural products as a basis for determining agricultural activity, but 
it acknowledges that government intervention has resulted in distortions in production and trade that must 
be corrected.  The Community advocates that the process of reform be implemented gradually and carried 
only to  the point of re-establishing balanced markets  and  a more market-oriented agricultural trading 
system. 
The United States and  the Cairns Group countries are apparently ready to  allow international 
market signals to exercise the principal influence on the structures and operations of  agricultural industries 
subject only to low levels of tariffs and the availability of contingent protection against import surges, 
trade-distorting production and export subsidies and dumping.  These countries assert that income support, 
if provided, should not influence production or trade.  There are some conditions attached to the support 
of  these exporting countries for relatively free trade in agriculture, but their positions reflect an underlying 
confidence that their own agricultural  sectors  are  capable of competing  successfully  in  international 
markets. 
8 
The European countries are willing to allow world market forces to exert a greater influence over 
their agricultural production and trade, but they insist on the right to protect their farmers from all-out 
competition and wish to retain mechanisms that would buffer national prices against at least some of the 
variability of world prices and  currency movements.  They foresee a continuing,  albeit restricted and 
contingent, role for quantitative border controls.  Japan and the food-deficit developing countries want 
to operate border protection for food  security, rural development, and farm income support purposes. 
Thus, an accommodation must be found if the key negotiations on import access are to succeed. 
Possible Compromise 
The US and CG proposal to convert all  NTBs to tariffs and reduce them would result in a major 
improvement in import access for agriculture.  The conversion will be difficult to achieve because border 
controls (import quotas, variable levies,  state trading) are an integral part of the administrative policy 
arrangements for farm products followed by many countries.  A movement to tariffs precludes national 
price fixing  unless  extensive use is  made of deficiency payments-a development with little appeal  to 
Ministers of Finance.  The challenge of tariffication to traditional price setting is common to most of the 
EC commodity market regimes, to Japan's system of parastatal purchasing, to Canada's administered 
pricing systems for milk and poultry products, and to the arrangements in the United States for setting 
support prices for milk and sugar.  Even where specific product prices are not set, tariffs do not provide 
the absolute protection afforded by import quotas and minimum import prices, or by the import licensing, 
procurement  and  pricing  practices  of parastatal  trading  agencies.  In this  regard,  the  fact  that  the 
8 Even some exporting countries desire to retain exceptional treatmentfor parts of  their agriculture.  The developing country 
exporters want open access to the markets of  industrial countries but wish to retain the flexibility to limit imports to develop their 
. ownfood and agricultural industries.  Canada is seeking a continuation of  the right to impose quantitative restrictions consistent 
with a clarified A.rticle XI:2(c) in support of  effective supply management programs. 
6 Community has offered to tariffy partially its variable import levies is particularly significant.  It offers 
a way of providing improved access to import markets and in "recoupling" domestic and international 
prices for farm and food products.  It means, among other things, that the negotiations on import access 
can avoid market sharing through politically determined minimum access agreements. 
Though the Community is not prepared to accept the full conversion of variable import levies to 
fixed tariffs, their partial conversion would be an important step in that direction.  From this perspective, 
negotiations on the matter of tariffication need no longer be concerned with principles, but they can now 
move to details. 
Essentially what needs to be negotiated now is the extent to which changes in Community variable 
import levies are to be tariffied.  Panel a. of Figure 1 shows one possible option.  Currently, under the 
EC's variable levy system, the entire amount of any decline in an exporter's price (the lowest offer price 
on the world market) is offset by an increase in the variable levy.  The proportion of this price change 
offset by a change in variable levies could be negotiated and bound in GAIT: this would constitute a 
modified tariffication of variable import levies.  As show in Figure 1,  in the first year of a transition 
period, 90 percent of the price decline is offset by an increase in the variable levy, 80 percent in year 2, 
70  percent  in  year  3  etc.  thus  gradually  approaching  a  fixed  tariff.9  In  this  way,  producers  and 
consumers in the Community are initially spared some of the variation in world prices but would face 
increasingly market-oriented price signals over the course of  some transition period.  The present position 
of the United States (and the Cairns Group) is for the full amount of the price decline to be reflected in 
the Community's internal prices. 
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Figure 1.  Modified Tariffication of Variable Levies. 
9 A formal approach to  this process is presented in Annex 2. 
7 The limitation on the offset need not be symmetric, adjusting differently to price increases than 
to decline,  nor continuous in that the 'correction factor'  could be triggered by large variations but be 
unchanged for small variations. 
The variation in the value of the dollar buffeted the Community in the 1980s, and so it is keen 
to protect producers and consumers from future variations in exchange rates.  The EC's proposal indicates 
that world price changes arising from exchange rate changes should be treated differently from that arising 
from other factors.  The decline in the world price can be effectively divided into two parts: that due to 
the decline in the price measured in its currency; and that due to a change in the value of its currency 
relative to those of  the Community.  This is show in Panel b. of Figure 1.  Currently, the variable import 
levy will increase to fully offset both effects.  The EC approach of modified tariffication would require 
that a 'corrective factor' offset, partially or fully, the impact of currency value changes.  The offset for 
a currency value change could be negotiated and bound in GATT.  In Panel b. of Figure 1, the increase 
in the variable import levy offsets the full  amount of the price decline due to the currency value change 
and 90 percent of the decline in the exporter's price in the first year of an agreement.  In year 2, it would 
offset 80 percent of a decline in an exporter's price, etc. 
The reform package on import access  would  have to  include the phasing out of all  waivers, 
derogations and country specific exceptions.  In addition, to be acceptable as a basis for removing border 
restrictions or converting NTBs into tariffs, all restrictions not covered by GATT such as variable levies, 
minimum import prices, and voluntary export restraints would have to be subject to GATT disciplines. 
The question of rebalancing protection levels may be negotiable in the context of commitments 
on AMS-based reductions in border restraints and internal subsidies and the conversion of some of these 
measures to tariff-equivalent forms.  Although increases in presently-bound rates of duty are likely to be 
strongly opposed by most countries, there may be scope for negotiating tariff quotas to be phased out over 
a transition period. 
The role of  Article XI:2(c) will depend significantly on the extent of  agreement reached on overall 
reductions in protection, tariffication and rebalancing.  However, based on the latest submissions, a role 
is envisaged by all countries except the US for Article XI:2(c) at least throughout the transition period. 
There is  a need to clarify the conditions for  its use, for example by giving objective precision to  such 
terms  as  "like products"  and  "processed  form"  in  relation  to  the  application of quantitative  import 
restraints.  But it is  difficult to foresee a widening of the exception, such as  would be enough to  meet 
Japan's proposals or Canada's supply managed groups' desires.  On the contrary, to be consistent with 
the objectives of the negotiation, and possible compromises contemplated, the exception for agriculture 
in Article XI:2(c) should be narrowed rather than broadened.1o  The importance and sensitivity of food 
security to  several  countries  and  the existence of supply  controls  in others  may  warrant exceptional 
treatment, but this should not weaken the overall reform package or the fundamental objectives of the 
GATT system, which inter alia, requires that efficient exporters have improving opportunities to satisfy 
consumer's demands in import markets. 
10 The disciplines applying to export restraints which are contained in this Article should be strengthened as advocated by 
Japan. 
8 IV. Export Subsidies 
The issue of export subsidies  is  among  the most urgent of the tasks  to  be addressed by the 
negotiators.  In the light of the major disruptions to agricultural trade in the 1980s arising from the use 
of export subsidies, effective action in this area is imperative.  Indeed, an agreement to reduce, to limit, 
and to discipline export subsidies-and better yet to eliminate them entirely-could be the most significant 
result for agriculture in the Uruguay Round.  An agreement would confer multiple benefits.  It would 
force subsidizing exporters to modify their farm support programs.  The frictions between the EC and the 
US in their grain trade would be reduced.  A re-run into the 1990s of the costly competitive subsidy wars 
of  the 1980s would be avoided.  The economic damage done to the grain exporting members of  the Cairns 
Group would be eliminated.  The dairy and beef exports of Australia and New Zealand, the beef exports 
of  Latin America, and the sugar exports of  Australia and many developing countries would be less harmed 
by the aids to exports of dairy products, beef and sugar provided by the EC.  More generally, importing 
countries would lose a much-used excuse for shielding their producers from international competition. 
Export Subsidies in the Comprehensive Proposals 
Though there is  general agreement on the problem, the question as  to how to  control  export 
subsidies is still on the table.  The choice is essentially between direct and indirect measures to address 
the issue.  Both the US  and the Cairns Group propose a complete prohibition of export subsidies after 
some phase-out period.  The US  proposal suggests a phase-out period of five years, while the Cairns 
Group envisages a period of "ten years or less."  The EC does not envisage a ban on the use of export 
subsidies but agrees that there is  a need to  lower the level and discipline their use.  Japan favors  the 
eventual elimination of export subsidies, and the Nordic countries advocate the same approach for these 
subsidies. 
Both the US and the Cairns Group proposals suggest a binding of  upper limits of  export subsidies 
during the phase-out period.  The US suggests a binding of the total money value of subsidies or of the 
quantities of  subsidized exports.  The Cairns Group countries want to bind and reduce both the total value 
of national expenditure and the unit value of export subsidies, and, though this is not spelled out in their 
proposal, the probable intention is that the more binding of  these two constraints would have to be applied 
at any point in time. 
The bound level of export subsidies would be gradually reduced during the phase-out period, 
though both proposals are unclear about the exact mode of reduction.  The Cairns Group speaks of a 
"progressive" phase-out which, taken literally, could mean a reduction by a higher percentage in each 
successive year of the phase-out period.  The US  proposal  does  not specify any  particular mode of 
reduction. 
The Cairns Group and EC proposals on the use of an AMS could indirectly limit and reduce the 
use of export subsidies, since agreed reductions of AMS  and  consequent commitments to cut domestic 
support  prices  would  impose  limits  on the  amount  of output  available  for  export  and  the  rate  of 
subsidization.  However, the explicit provisions regarding export subsidies in the Cairns Group proposal 
are intended to be more direct and more readily handled as contractually binding agreements than such 
indirect restrictions. 
The  EC  proposal  relies  mainly  on  AMS  reductions  on  overall  support  to  reduce  export 
subsidization.  Possibly for this reason, the EC proposal is extremely short as far as explicit provisions 
9 regarding export subsidies are concerned.  When speaking of reductions in protection and tariffication, 
the proposal adds, cryptically, that "the same arrangement would apply to exports, the amount granted 
to  exports could not exceed that levied on imports."  It is  not clear which of the two parts of this 
statement contains the policy change.  If  it is  the second part, then no  new and separate discipline on 
export subsidies is envisaged in the EC proposal.  A binding and reduction of import barriers would de 
facto impose some discipline on export subsidies as well,l1  simply because arbitrage would be triggered 
if export subsidies exceeded import tariffs.  The EC proposal would merely codify this de facto limit. 
Hence,  this  interpretation  of the  EC  proposal  would  mean  that  there  would  be  no  new  explicit 
commitments regarding export subsidies, but that governments would be compelled to  reduce export 
subsidies as tariffs were progressively reduced.  This is unlikely to be acceptable to the US  and CG for 
which explicit commitments on export subsidies are a sine qua non for a successful negotiation. 
In this regard, an alternative and more interesting interpretation of  the EC proposal would be that 
the first part of the statement specifies the policy change.  This suggests the establishment of explicit 
commitments for export subsidies, such that the same basic procedure suggested by the EC for import 
tariffs ("modified tariffication") would be applied to export subsidies.  This would mean that there would 
be partial bindings on export subsidies per unit, where the permissible export subsidy would have a "fixed 
component" and a "corrective factor" to buffer some fraction of the effects of world commodity market 
and exchange rate changes much like the approach to tariffs outlined above.  Indeed, the EC should not 
find  it  difficult  to  accept  such  a  discipline  on  export  subsidies  once  it  had  agreed  to  "modified 
tariffication" on the import side. 
One issue has always created problems for a "rules" approach to export subsidies.  It is not easy 
to define what constitutes such a subsidy.  Only the US proposal contains an explicit definition of export 
subsidies.  This is in the form of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies contained in the Tokyo Round 
Subsidies-Countervail Code which is annexed to the US proposal.  The Cairns Group proposal only says 
that "the subsidy practices involved will need to be clearly identified and defined."  The EC proposal is 
silent on the definition of export subsidies. 
Both the United States and the Cairns Group proposals recognize the difficulties  involved in 
distinguishing between subsidized exports and food aid.  The Cairns Group suggestion to overcome these 
difficulties is to propose that all food aid should be provided on a grant basis.  The US proposal is less 
restrictive and only speaks of "new rules (which) may need to be developed to govern the granting of food 
aid."  The EC proposal, in its section on special and differential treatment, explicitly favors food aid "not 
only in the form of  donations, but also in the form of concessional sales with an important grant element. " 
None of the proposals deals with export subsidies for processed products.  The EC proposal, in 
its section on the SMU, mentions vaguely that "processed products should also be covered, " but provides 
no suggestions as to how this could be done.  The US proposal, however, deals with differential export 
taxes on raw materials and their processed derivatives which favor the domestic processing industry, and 
it proposes that export taxes should be uniform along the processing chain.  12 
11  Differentiated (targeted) export subsidies can exceed the level of  import tariffs by the cost of  transportation to andfrom 
the target country. 
12 This suggestion may overlook the fact that even with uniform tariffs or taxes along a processing chain there is protection 
of  the value added in processing, equal to the tariff or lax rate. 
10 The central difference between the proposals is  of course the issue of whether or not export 
subsidies should be completely eliminated, and of how to restrict the level of subsidies until they are 
eventually  eliminated.  It may  look  as  if the different  negotiating  positions  are too  far  apart for  a 
compromise to be found.  However, it is useful to disregard the polemics of the debate and to concentrate 
on details of the alternative proposals.  The two views may be capable of reconciliation. 
Disciplining variable export subsidies could be accomplished in the same manner as that described 
above for variable import subsidies.  Currently, variable export subsidies fully offset a decline in border 
prices as illustrated in Figure 1.  This offset could be limited to some fixed proportion and this proportion 
be reduced through time.  In this way, as was the case for variable import levies, after some adjustment 
period variable export subsidies would be reduced and approach a fixed export subsidy. 
From this point of view the compromise could come in the form of finding parameter values 
which would determine the extent to  which world market price reductions can be reflected in subsidy 
increases.  At the same time,  an  agreement would  be needed  regarding the base level  of the  fixed 
component, Le. F(O),  and concerning the reference level of world market prices and exchange rates.  In 
all these cases, average values of a base period, say 1986 to 1988, could be chosen. 
Another element of the compromise could be that subsidy limits could be agreed on the basis of 
such formulae for an initial period of, say, five years with meetings held after that period in order to 
reconsider and possibly revise the adjustment formulae. 
Possible Compromise 
On the matter of the definition of export subsidy practices,  a compromise should not be too 
difficult to find.  The notion of an Illustrative List is certainly a good starting point, but it may have to 
be extended by adding the commonly used aids intended to promote agricultural exports.  The distinction 
between food  aid  and  subsidized exports  may  cause problems.  It is  not certain that the commercial 
imports of  food aid recipient countries would be unaffected if  all food aid were provided on a grant basis. 
One may have to live with a continued negotiating and monitoring process such as that provided by the 
FAO Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal, where behavior is constrained partly by written rules but also 
by the dangers  to  each  country of others  emulating  its  own dubious  export practices  and  behavior. 
Agreement could probably be reached that export subsidies on processed products could not exceed the 
permitted level (if any) of  the export assistance that could have been legally provided to the raw products 
they contain. 
V. Domestic Subsidies 
Domestic Subsidies in the Comprehensive Proposals 
All  four  proposals  define the objectives of the negotiations on domestic subsidies within the 
framework of the 1989  Geneva Accord insofar  as  they  reaffirm their willingness,  inter alia,  to  make 
"substantial and progressive reductions" in those elements of their domestic subsidies to agriculture that 
are deemed to distort trade.  The most notable differences lie in the interpretation of the "reach" and the 
way in which to operationalize the obligation. 
The US has the most ambitious goal in calling for the complete elimination after a to-year phase-
out period of most of the commonly-used instruments of farm price and income support.  The US  sees 
11 only a minor role for an AMS, relying instead on rules to categorize policy instruments and specify policy 
constraints to phase out illegal instruments and to reduce the trade effects and discipline the use of other 
policy measures.  The Cairns Group proposal is marginally less ambitious in that it is less prohibitory. 
It calls for a reform process that would reduce the level of support provided by trade-affecting domestic 
policy instruments by an unspecified amount over a period of 10 years or less.  However, the Cairns 
Group proposal  is  operationally far-reaching  insofar  as  it places  primary reliance on specific  policy 
commitments.  The EC proposal is more conservative in that the Community reaffirms its intention to 
continue product-price-centered farm income supports and to retain its dual pricing system.  Moreover, 
though it agrees that support levels should be reduced, the Community seeks only to reduce the trade 
effects of products in surplus and to the extent necessary to restore market balance and responsiveness. 
The Japanese proposal contains little of a specific nature about domestic subsidies beyond emphasizing 
the need for the international community to recognize and to accept the larger purposes of subsidies to 
agriculture, including, but not confined to, the goal of balancing food  security by maintaining desired 
levels of self-sufficiency. 
Differences and Similarities 
While there is general agreement that the trade effects of a subsidy are influenced by its level as 
well as  its method of operation, all four proposals acknowledge that concrete progress can be made by 
categorizing farm program instruments and ranking them according to their anticipated trade effects.  The 
US  and the Cairns Group have proposed that subsidies be classified on a traffic light system:  "red" for 
prohibited, "amber" for permitted but disciplined; and "green" for permitted.  The degree of specificity 
varies, but there is  substantial agreement that there is  a large number of programs that do  not distort 
trade,  or have effects  that are well  within  any  reasonable de  minimus standard.  For these policies, 
international commitments are unnecessary.  These"  green light" policies include the provision of public 
goods,  environment  and  conservation  expenditures,  disaster  relief,  food  aid,  resource  retirement, 
adjustment assistance, and  fully decoupled income payments.  There is  agreement that these permitted 
policies would have to be clearly defined and tightly circumscribed.  There is also broad agreement on 
which are the policies that most distort trade.  These "red light" policies would include administrative 
pricing arrangements that raise producer prices above competitive levels, by market price supports and 
deficiency payments, other fully coupled income supports, and subsidies to transport, investments and 
other inputs that are not generally available to other sectors.  These are the policies which would attract 
binding obligations.  However, whereas the U.S. proposes and some Cairns Group countries would prefer 
their phasing mit. the Cairns Group as a whole, the EC and Japan foresee only substantial and progressive 
reductions in support levels and surer GAIT disciplines on their use. 
All proposals envision a formula approach to a negotiated reduction in support.  However, the 
U.S.  subordinates  a  formula  approach  to  the  phasing-out  of prohibited  instruments  under  bound 
commodity and program-specific commitments.  Formula cuts using an AMS  are confined in the U.S. 
proposal to the obligations assumed for  "permitted but disciplined" (amber light) programs.  The Cairns 
Group envisions an AMS being used to measure the initial level of protection, to express the overall target 
reduction in support, and to monitor progress.  However, the CG also proposes that obligations to reduce 
domestic subsidization be in the form of specified adjustments to the prices, quantity and expenditure 
parameters of commodity-specific programs.  The EC wants support cuts to be expressed in terms of an 
overall obligation, to reduce a SMU, but with the depth and rhythm of cuts to vary with commodities and 
market conditions.  Japan proposes only that obligations on support reductions be expressed in terms of 
some AMS  and suggest the exclusion of programs that subsidize commodities in which self-sufficiency 
is low.  . 
12 The attitude to  specific policy commitments  in the various proposals  is  the flip-side of their 
attitude to formula cuts.  Specific policy commitments hold fewer attractions for the EC and Japan, 
whereas the U.S. and the Cairns Group place major reliance on them as the means of giving verifiable 
substance to overall commitments.  In the case of both the U.S. and the Cairns Group, the phase-out of 
prohibited programs and the reduction in the support levels provided by programs to be disciplined would 
involve commodity-specific plans for changing administered prices, supported output levels and budgetary 
expenditures. 
There are no specific proposals on the table on the depth of cut to domestic subsidies or on the 
time-frame, except that the U.S. proposal for prohibiting most of the commonly-used methods of farm 
income support envisions their complete elimination (zero) over a ten-year period.  No target reduction 
in the support provided by "permitted but disciplined" programs is identified in the U.S. proposal.  The 
Cairns Group envisages a reform process of unspecified dimensions taking place over 10 years or less. 
The EC proposes that the initial commitments be for five years with further commitments - if needed -
being established by a review in the fourth year. 
The major players all envision that rules changes will be made where appropriate to give legal 
form  to  the  agreements  to  reduce  the  support provided  by the domestic  subsidies  that  cause trade 
distortions.  This would entail some unspecified mix of changes to the articles of  the General Agreement 
and to the Subsidies-Countervail Code; the elaboration or addition of  interpretative notes to these;  or even 
the adoption of a special agreement on agriculture.  The measurement of  the proxy indicator  of  the trade 
distortions produced by domestic subsidies (the AMS), the agreed cut and time-frame, and the detailed 
criteria that would characterize and circumscribe the three categories of  program instruments would also 
have to be specified in agreed and legally binding texts.  If the route of specific policy commitments on 
domestic subsidies was taken, then these too would have to be detailed in binding schedules, both to allow 
monitoring of progress and to discipline countervailing actions. 
Notable Omissions 
A number of matters pertaining to domestic subsidies are not addressed directly in the proposals. 
These could be important elements in the subsidy component of the negotiations, in the success of an 
overall agricultural accord, and to individual countries.  Three of these matters are identified here. 
First, the linkage between an agreement on agricultural subsidies and the work of the group 
renegotiating the Subsidies-Countervail Code could be important.  Both of  these negotiating groups appear 
to be using a "traffic light" approach to the categorization of subsidies and it is necessary for the general 
criteria used in each group be coincident, not least because the identification of  trade-distorting subsidies 
has  implications  both  for  obligations  to  change  policies  or  program  parameters  in  a  multilateral 
agricultural accord and for the use of countervail duties in bilateral trade relations. 
Second, it is  imperative that early agreement be reached on the attributes of policies that cause 
them to be categorized as  non-trade distorting and so permitted, or partially or nonequivocally trade 
distorting and so to be subjected to negotiated reduction of  eliminated and prohibition after some phase-out 
period.  13 
13 For afuU disclLSsion of  these attributes of  domestic policies see the IATRC papers on "Designing Acceptable Policies" and 
"Reinstrumentation of  Agricultural Policies. ,. 
13 Third, the various proposals are silent or guarded on the policy instruments which are now in use 
in some countries and which could become more important in the future.  These include both safety nets 
and supply controls.  The status of  the first is important because while governments may agree to reduce 
the degree of subsidization of their farmers,  they  are likely to  want to  retain the right to  share with 
farmers the down-side risks of markets and to alleviate the dysfunctional instability that is characteristic 
of agricultural markets (albeit that instabilities will be reduced by agricultural trade liberalization).  The 
trade effects of supply controls will also have to be addressed: countries that use them want "credits" in 
the negotiation; their incorporation into AMS variants remains a contentious issue; and decisions will have 
to  be  made  about  whether  AMS-based  reductions  will  apply  to  the  administered  prices  that  are 
implemented by supply management techniques.  Also, there is a direct connection between the status 
of supply controls and changes to national import regimes, the tariffication of NTBs, and the future of 
Article XI; 2(c) of the General Agreement. 
Possible Compromise 
There is  an  important area of agreement  among the negotiating countries that many types of 
government programs are non-trade distorting and not therefore subject to constraints.  Also, there is a 
mounting interest in reinstrumenting policies with price and income support and stabilization objectives 
so as  to decouple them from specific commodities, limit them to maximum quantities of output, adapt 
them so  that at the margin production and consumption are guided by competitive prices, and even to 
replace them with programs that correct for farm income inadequacies directly.  The negotiators provide 
incentives for national farm policies to be channelled more surely in such directions.  Beyond that all 
agree  that  the  support  provided  to  farmers  through  programs  that  have  trade  effects  by  changing 
production, marketing and consumption decisions should be subjected to a formula-based cut.  Assuming 
early agreement can be reached on the list of programs that distort trade, the crucial negotiating step is 
to agree on the depth of cut and time frame. 
Thereafter, negotiations will have to lead to agreements on the other subsidy issues which are in 
dispute.  One of these is  whether any domestic assistance programs should be phased out entirely:  It 
could well be that while some border measures will be prohibited, no domestic subsidies will be outlawed. 
A second matter for decision is the nature of the AMS used for scaling down domestic programs.  The 
SMU proposed by the Ee has much merit, but raises issues of credit for supply control and the choice 
of reference period that still require agreeIl}.ent.  A third area-the role of specific policy commitments-
presents considerable difficulties.  At one extreme, giving countries the flexibility to choose how they' 
would meet an overall commitment to reduce support by an amount expressed in the SMU runs the danger 
that genuine reforms in sensitive areas will be avoided.  On the other hand, to seek agreement on finely-
detailed schedules of farm program changes runs the risk of bogging the negotiations down in requests 
and offers and imposing potentially unacceptable constraints on national authorities.  A compromise might 
be found  in  negotiating  partners  being  required  to  indicate  how  they  would  propose to  meet  these 
objections  only  in  respect of the  (dozen or so)  most  distortive  policies  for  major  commodities  and 
countries.  A further  area for  negotiated  resolution  is  whether  support should  be cut by  a uniform 
percentage or by proportions that vary directly with their base-levels, and whether a support ceiling should 
be imposed.  At this juncture it appears that the negotiators  may  have to  be satisfied  with  an  initial 
agreement  to  cut  domestic  subsidy  support  by  a  uniform  percentage  amount,  overall  and  for  all 
commodities, rather than open the "pandora's box" of differentiated support cuts. 
14 VI. Phytosanitary and Sanitary Regulations (PSR) 
Negotiations on improving the operation of  sanitary and phytosanitary regulations as they impact 
on agricultural trade are an  integral part of each of the comprehensive proposals.  At the Mid-Term 
Review, ministers endorsed the long-term goal of "harmonization of national regulations" and adopted a 
work program for the rest of the negotiations which would: 14 
(1)  "develop harmonization ...  on the basis of  appropriate standards established by relevant 
international organizations . . .;" 
(2)  "strengthen Article XX so that measures taken ...  are consistent with sound scientific 
evidence and use principles of equivalency;" 
(3)  "review  existing  notification  and  counter-notification procedures  to  ensure ...  the 
existence of an effective notification process ...  ;" 
(4)  "develop a consultative process which would ensure transparency and allow for bilateral 
resolution of disputes;" 
(5)  improve the effectiveness of multilateral dispute settlement processes . . . to provide the 
necessary input of scientific expertise and judgement . . .;" 
(6)  "assess the possible effects on developing countries ...  ;" 
There is, in general, much less disagreement on the steps to be taken to improve GATT rules in 
this area than in those of import access and subsidies.  Nevertheless, important issues have to be resolved. 
One  of these  concerns  the  best  way  to  achieve  the  "harmonization"  called  for  in  the  Mid-Term 
Agreement.  Two alternative approaches have been proposed for the harmonization of  national regulations. 
These are summarized in the table below. 
TABLE 1.  Approaches to Harmonization of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations. 
Approach  Negotiations 
Harmonization through  Negotiation of procedures and processes to identify 
conformity of national  GATT  -confonning standards for product characteristics 
standards 
and for production and processing methods (PPM), and 
the detennination of confonnity of national regulations 
with those standards.  In this case, regulations would be 
judged to confonn with Article XX.  Existing 
international standards, and the scientific expertise of 
international organizations, would contribute to the 
identification of confonning standards and of the 
confonnity of national regulations. 
Recognition of the  Negotiation of procedures and processes to detennine 
equivalence of different  the equivalence of alternative regUlations  for product 
regulations 
characteristics and PPM. 
Existing international standards, and the scientific 
expertise of international organizations would contribute 
to the detennination of equivalence of alternative 
regulations. 
14 GAIT Mid-Term Review Agreement, April 1989. 
15 Conformity insures national treatment (i. e.  that imports receive the same treatment as domestic 
production) on the basis of conformity with internationally-recognized standards.  Equivalence allows 
national treatment on the basis of a comparison of national regulations in the importing and exporting 
nations.  In either framework, GA TI rules and disciplines must be strengthened, and a dispute settlement 
process must be developed. IS 
Differences and Similarities 
The main issues on which the proposals concentrate include the modification to Article XX of  the 
GA TI,  that  covers  general  exceptions  to  the  GA TI rules,  including  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary 
Regulations; the process for notification and consultation; the arrangements for dispute settlement; and 
the form of any strengthened GA TI rules in this area.  There is  substantial agreement that Article XX 
must be strengthened.  It  would seem that at a minimum, Article XX could be amended to require nations 
to participate fully  in  international  standards organizations.  Countries could agree to  utilize existing 
international standards in formulating national regulations and to  recognize those organizations as  the 
principle source of scientific and technical expertise in international trade disputes.  Countries could be 
asked to accept that conformity or equivalence must be based on sound scientific evidence.  In this regard, 
the United States has proposed that Article XX(b) be amended to provide that: 
"nothing in the agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any Contracting Party of measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant, life or 
health, provided that these measures are consistent with sound scientific evidence and 
recognize the principle of equivalency. "16 
The European Community has proposed almost identical rights and obligations, although in less definitive 
and formal language. 17  The Japanese proposal is generally supportive of  other proposals, but stops short 
of a  change  in  Article  XX.  The amendment of Article XX  must,  of course,  be supported  by  the 
strengthening of other GA TI instruments to address the issues of  notification and dispute settlement.  All 
proposals have drawn heavily from the Standards Code in the area of  notification and counter-notification. 
The EC proposal calls for the determination of notification procedures on "the basis of those procedures 
which exist in the Standards Code"  and a "consultation process along the lines of that contained in the 
Standards  Code .  .  ."  18  The language in  the U.S.  proposal dealing  with these two  areas  is  almost 
identical to that found  in the Standards Code.  The Nordic Countries propose a strengthening of the 
existing Code or the negotiation of a separate code.  Thus, substantial agreement exists on the nature of 
the notification and consultation processes. 
Proposals for dispute settlement so far have been rather vague.  The EC has proposed that all 
issues be examined by a single panel,  and  noted that the provision for technical consultations already 
exists in the GATI's rules.  The United States has proposed that GATI instruments be drafted that would 
15 A third approach to the issue of  different national regulations is being used by the European Community in  liberalizing 
its internal market.  The principle of  "mutual recognition" of  the standards of  other countries implies that different standards can 
co-exist (with  adequate labelling) in the same market.  This approach has not been suggested for the GATT negotiations. 
16  GATT,  Submission of  the United States,  Oct.  1989. 
17 GATT,  Global Proposal of  the EC; Dec.  1989. 
18 GATT,  Global Proposal of  the EC. 
16 require international standards to be considered by panels in determining whether a particular national 
measures is based on sound scientific evidence.  The U.S. proposal also implies greater rights for the 
challenging countries.  Along the lines of proposals made in the negotiations on the Standards Code, the 
burden of proof would  be shared  by  the  challenging  and  the challenged  country.  Specifically,  the 
challenged country could be asked to show that the offending regulation is consistent with sound scientific 
evidence. 
There is still some disagreement on the appropriate form of the GA'IT instrument to formalize 
areas of agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.  The options are to write additional GA'IT 
articles, or to add an interpretive note to Article XX;  to strengthen and expand the Standards Code, or 
to negotiate a separate code for agricultural sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.  The United States 
favors the negotiation of additional GA'IT articles or the addition of an interpretive note to the revised 
GA'IT articles;  the Nordics favor the negotiation of a separate code;  and  the EC has  not indicated a 
preferred approach. 
Possible Compromise 
Given the broad areas of substantive agreement, there should be ample opportunity to arrive at 
a  compromise  that  contributes  to  a  lessening  of the  adverse  effects  of sanitary  and  phytosanitary 
regulations on agricultural trade.  Such a compromise could include an amendment to Article XX along 
the lines discussed above to formalize the role of sound science and international organizations, and  a 
strengthening and  expansion of the Standards  Code to  more fully  address  production and  processing 
methods, and· dispute settlement.  In addition,  it should be possible to add either an interpretive note, a 
further amendment to Article XXIII (which defines nullification or impairment of benefits derived from 
the-GAm, or an additional  article to  formalize a dispute settlement process that would apply to  all 
contracting parties in dispute over sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. 
These elements should embrace the concept of equivalence rather than that of strict conformity 
for two reasons.  First, the world of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations is far too complex to arrive 
at a single set of GA'IT  -conforming standards.  Second, the GA'IT process should focus on resolving 
bilateral  disputes;  that  is,  to  consider  only  those  (few)  areas  of substantial  bilateral  disagreement. 
Negotiations on sanitary and phytosanitary regulations should not be viewed in the traditional sense of 
gains and concessions.  Each country is trying to improve trading conditions.  If successful, all countries 
will  be "winners"  in improved transparency  in  international trades.  All  countries will  gain from the 
removal  of unnecessary  trade  barriers,  from  the  prevention  of the  use  of standards  as  concealed 
protection, and from the enhanced predictability that flows from transparency, national treatment and non-
discrimination. 
VII. Special and Differential Treatment 
General agreement exists among the four major proposals from the United States, the European 
Community, the Cairns Group and Japan that special and differential treatment (S&D) should be accorded 
to developing countries (LDCs).  However, the nature of the special treatment and the degree to which 
it should be allowed to be different in relation to GA'IT rules and disciplines varies among the proposals. 
The developed  countries  are  reluctant to  write a generalized  "dual  standard"  in the GA'IT,  and  are 
unwilling to ignore the great differences among developing countries in their ability to contribute to the 
reform process. 
17 All agree that LDCs should be full participants in the negotiations and in GAIT agreements and 
obligations.  The main component of S&D common to all four proposals is to allow LDCs more policy 
flexibility and a longer time frame in which to make overall reforms of agricultural policy and trade in 
the Uruguay Round.  Both the United States and the European Community indicate that the advanced 
developing countries-presumably the  Newly  Industrialized  countries  (NICs)- should be expected to 
comply on the same schedule as the developed countries. 
The Cairns Group and the United States further suggest that special concessions should be granted 
to LDCs for interventions aimed at basic infrastructural and long term agricultural development that lead 
to increased food self-sufficiency and food security, although the United States would have this special 
treatment phased out as development occurs. 
A distinction is  often made between the treatment of developing country food  importers and 
developing country food exporters with regard to S&D.  Even the developing country proposals and 
submissions to the GAIT tend to emphasize the role of s&D mechanisms for LDC food importers rather 
than for LDC food exporters.  The implied consensus is that LDC food exporters would benefit from 
trade liberalization along with developed country agricultural exporters, and thus have less or no need for 
S&D.  The United States, however, suggests that priority be given to reduction of protection on products 
of export interest to the LDCs. 
The European Community proposal, alone among the four major proposals, joins the developing 
country food importers in calling for compensation in the form of  additional food aid donations and grants 
to  offset the higher world market prices for food  expected  under trade liberalization.  Some of the 
developing countries'  proposals  go  further  and  are more specific.  For example,  one proposal  lists 
concessional sales, subsidized credit, grants and increased food aid, along with early increased import 
access (perhaps on a preferential basis) for products of  export interest to the LDCs.  It goes on to suggest 
special consideration be given to higher food  import bills in structural adjustment programs related to 
external debt restructuring and increased technical and economic assistance from the developed world for 
LDC agricultural development.  Finally, the developing countries that are not members of the Cairns 
Group appear to support the continuation of the concept of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
established in prior GAIT rounds. 
At this  stage  in the negotiations,  all  countries,  including the LDCs,  are trying to  stake out 
bargaining positions that are clearly in their self interest.  But there appears little disagreement on the 
underlying issues.  The developed countries have already accepted that developing countries may need 
a  longer  time  frame  for  compliance  with  any  agriculture  agreement  and  greater  flexibility  in  the 
instrumentation of their national agricultural and trade policies.  It should be possible to negotiate the 
specifics, given the acceptance of the principle.  This real concession, along with priority reduction of 
import access barriers on products of interest to developing countries, coupled with some concessions 
relating to food security and  a general undertaking by developed countries to use their best efforts to 
respond to increased demands by LDCs for food, technical and economic assistance, should provide an 
acceptable compromise without unduly weakening the nature of the global agreement on agriculture. 
18 The negotiations  on S&D  are unlikely  to  hold  up  progress  in  the  Uruguay  Round.19  The 
developed countries have already recognized the special and differential needs of  the developing countries 
and agreed to their minimum agricultural demands.  With an overall outcome that promises the LDCs 
improved export earnings, the issue of S&D need not be a stumbling block in this negotiation. 
VIll. Non-Trade Concerns 
In the  April  Mid-Term GATT  Agreement  a new  concept  was  introduced,  the  notion of the 
importance of taking into account "non-trade concerns"  in shaping agricultural and food trade policies. 
Japan  and  several  European countries  took  the lead  in  introducing  this  concept  into  the  Mid-Term 
Agreement.  The apparent rationale was that every country has food security, social, environmental and 
food  safety objectives that they wish to  satisfy with their domestic agricultural policies.  The EC,  in 
supporting this concept, was thinking particularly of issues of environmental quality and rural community 
viability that are increasingly important elements in the evolution of Europe's agricultural policies. 
The introduction of this concept into the negotiations is not surprising since it is at the heart of 
many domestic policy interventions.  But the way the concept has been picked up and interpreted in the 
self interest of each negotiating nation is disturbing, if not counterproductive.  Japan has interpreted non-
trade concerns as one way to avoid concessions being required of major food importing countries (such 
as  itself).  Japanese concern over food  security  is  very real,  and  certainly  at  the heart of domestic 
policy.20  But  in the Japanese case,  the worry over  food  security  is  of a different nature than the 
concerns  of many  developing  countries.  The Japanese  even  in  periods  of short  supply  and  high 
international prices have little difficulty paying the bill for the food  imports required.  Japan's main 
concern is that supplying countries might use export embargoes in periods of short supply, thus making 
it difficult to obtain food needs from the international market.  This Japanese concern can be addressed 
rather easily and directly by GATT rules on assurances of  unfettered access to sources of  supply, parallel 
to a set of rules on assurances for exporters of minimum market access.  The centerpiece of such  rules 
would be a prohibition on short-supply embargoes, perhaps supplemented by rationing rules prohibiting 
the licensing of exports at less than some agreed percentage of the historical level of shipments. 
While the developing countries appear willing to let Japan take the lead in interpreting "non-trade 
concerns" as  a being mainly about food security, their initial position was somewhat different.  In both 
the  combined and  individual  submissions by  the·  developing countries,  they  sought to  link non-trade 
concerns  with  proposals  for  special  and  differential  treatment,  including  compensation  for  higher 
international commodity import prices under trade liberalization, concessions on debt relief,  increased 
food aid, and expanded technical and economic assistance.  The introduction of non-trade concerns into 
the negotiation as a legitimate reason for resisting policy reform is particularly unfortunate if it reduced 
the pressure for needed trade liberalization in developing countries. 
19 With regard to S&:D, the tactical question seems to be what minimum S&:D concession package on agriculture (along with 
bener access into developed country markets from trade liberalizationfor products of  particular export interest to the LDCs) do 
the LDCs require from this negotiation to keep them from blocking agreements reached in other phases of  the Uruguay Round. 
20 Groups seeking to maintain protection are only too happy to use the food security argument to maintain present high price 
support policies  under  the  banner of "self sufficiency".  In  practice,  a  "self-sufficient"  Japan  would stiU  depend  on  the 
international market for the agricultural inputs (fertilizers, fuel,  chemicals) needed to grow its own food. 
19 One way to treat these non-trade concerns is to deal with them as specific issues rather than as 
an ill defined category of concerns that somehow take priority over the main thrust of the negotiations. 
This would remove the concept of "non-trade concerns" from the discussion and get on with resolution 
of  the basic trade issues involved.  This would also prevent "non-trade concerns" from clouding the issue 
of what  should be conceded  by the developed  countries  under the rubric of special  and  differential 
treatment for developing countries.  Those countries that want "non-trade concerns" considered should 
be required to request specific derogations from the obligations embodied in the comprehensive global 
accord  on  agriculture.  In this  way  the global  accord  would  not  contain  within  itself a  potentially 
destructive escape clause for "non-trade concerns." 
IX. Links With Other Parts of the Negotiations 
The  agricultural  negotiations  are  only  one  part  of the  activity  in  the  Uruguay  Round. 
Consideration of  the options for agriculture requires an assessment of  the links between agricultural talks 
and progress in other areas.  These linkages are of two kinds, which one might call "outcome" linkages 
and  "substance"  linkages.  Outcome linkages refer to  the impact that the outcome of one part of the 
negotiations can have on another, whereas substance linkages refer to the connections between the content 
of agricultural and non-agricultural discussions. 
The substance of  the agricultural negotiations has considerable overlap with that in other groups. 
The tariff negotiating group has been considering the role of "across-the-board" tariff cuts, as opposed 
to  ad  hoc request and  offer procedures.  This issue has  some similarity to  the use of an  AMS  in the 
agricultural talks.  The issue of converting non-tariff import barriers to tariffs has been discussed in the 
Non-Tariff Measures  Group.  Resolution  in  favor  of tariffication  in  one group  could  influence the 
discussion in the other.  Although the group considering changes in the GATT articles has not concerned 
itself with the agricultural provisions of Article XI and Article XVI, changes in other articles (e.g. XVII 
and XIX) could have an impact on the discussion of rule changes in the agricultural talks. 
The Group dealing with the MTN Codes is concerned with the operation of the Standards code, 
thereby overlapping with the discussion on sanitary and  phytosanitary regulations  in the Agricultural 
Group.  The MTN Code group is also considering amendments to the Subsidies-Countervail Code, which 
has a direct bearing on the discussion of export subsidies in agriculture.  In addition, a separate Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures Group is looking at issues of  domestic subsidies, dumping and countervailing 
duties  (as  covered  in the GATT articles,  as  opposed to  the MTN  Subsidies-Countervail  Code which 
applies only to signatories to the Code), has been considering the classification of subsidies in much the 
same terms as in agriculture. 
Among  the  major  outcome  linkages  are  the  impact  that  agreement  in  other  areas  of the 
negotiations would have on the pressure to conclude an agricultural pact.  Although agricultural trade has 
considerable importance for a number of countries, it is unlikely that the major participants (such as the 
EC, Japan, and the US) would allow the Uruguay Round to fail on account of an impasse in agriculture. 
This gives a boost to the pressures to reach an agricultural deal.  The EC and Japan could choose to give 
way on long-held positions in farm trade in order to secure their other objectives in the Uruguay Round 
and  to  avert the dangers of a collapse of the multilateral trading system.  But just as  likely is  a less 
satisfactory outcome, where the bold objectives that emerged in the early part of the Round would be 
shelved for a weak compromise, or a complex deal that contains little benefit for the trading system.  The 
US,  Canada, and  Australia, along with other exporters, would,  under this scenario, have to  make the 
20 concessions that allowed the EC and Japan to retain the essential elements of their agricultural and food 
trade policies in exchange for an overall "successful" Round. 
Such a compromise nearly emerged at the Mid-Term Meeting in Montreal, in December 1988, 
only to be rejected by the developing countries interested in agricultural trade.  Whether the strategy of 
issue linkage would be employed (or be successful) a second time is not clear.  But it is not impossible 
that LDC food  exporters might once again decline to  agree to progress  in new  trade areas,  such  as 
services,  intellectual  property rights  and  investment,  unless  they  are given relief from  the economic 
damage  they  suffer from  the  import protection,  export  assistance  and  subsidies  given to  farmers  in 
developed countries. 
Even if  the final outcome on agriculture does not depend upon a last-minute deal among the major 
actors, the balance of  outcomes from the various groups is important.  The Trade Negotiating Committee, 
the highest-level negotiating body, has agreed on the need for balanced outcomes, and instituted ways in 
which this can be pursued.  This again puts pressure on negotiators in groups where progress is slow to 
arrive at meaningful results.  The agricultural negotiating group has followed an impressive schedule of 
meetings and considered numerous proposals, many of which would entail sharp departures from present 
practice if implemented.  The willingness of agricultural negotiators to work toward an agreed package 
may not be in doubt, but the diversity of views as to what would be in that package may still be too great 
to be bridged in a few  months.  Significant breakthroughs may be needed in other areas to  create the 
climate for rapid agreement on ambitious goals in agriculture. 
X. The Common Ground and an Acceptable Compromise 
Earlier sections have revealed considerable areas of overlap among the major proposals.  This 
"common ground" gives some degree of  optimism that an agreement on agriculture may be possible.  The 
next question is  whether such a feasible compromise is  also  an  adequate response to  the problems of 
agricultural trade within the GATT.  This section explores this common ground and also identifies the 
minimum elements which would make a compromise package also desirable from the point of view of 
agricultural  trade in  the sense that  it  would  lead  to  a more efficient use of the  world's agricultural 
resources and incorporate trade in agriculture into a liberal and lawful world trading system. 
There appear to be eight elements of  broad agreement among the comprehensive proposals.  These 
are: 
(i)  That all Contracting Parties should abandon waivers, exemptions, grandfather clauses and 
other special treatments negotiated  in the past for agricultural trade policies within the GATT.  This 
principle of equal treatment of all countries would not interfere with special and differential treatment for 
developing  countries,  but would  remove the waivers  under which  certain developed  country policies 
operate in violation of GATT principles. 
(ii)  That all parties should substantially reduce the levels of protection and trade-distorting 
subsidization inherent in their agricultural programs.  Differences among countries about the ultimate 
depth and pace of such reductions should not prevent an agreement on the initial steps. 
(iii)  That more specific commitments  on individual  policies  are necessary,  both  as  a way  of 
ensuring that such  reductions  in  support and  protection do  in  fact  lead  to  greater market access  for 
21 exporters and to discourage the use of certain policy instruments which have a particularly undesirable 
impact on trade relationships. 
(iv)  These commitments  would  include  an  element of "tariffication"  of import levies  and 
quotas and measures with like effect to make import access barriers more transparent, domestic prices 
more responsive,  and  conformity with the principles,  rules,  and disciplines of the GATT more easily 
achieved. 
(v)  That specific commitments to reduce or remove export subsidies of at least equal force 
are also necessary in view of  the fact that the problem of  subsidized export competition is among the most 
serious facing agricultural trade. 
(vi)  That some domestic subsidies should be subject to discipline and  a phased reduction, 
whilst others should be allowed  to  go  undisciplined  and  even encouraged  as  an  alternative to  trade-
distorting policies. 
(vii)  That the GATT Article XX  dealing  with  restrictions on trade arising from  sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations be modified to deal better with the issues that arise from diverse standards in 
this area. 
(viii) That special and differential treatment should be afforded to those developing countries that 
would otherwise not be in a position to implement fully these changes. 
This  area of common ground  constitutes a'  remarkable step  forward  from  earlier agricultural 
negotiations in the GATT.  Among the few topics discussed in earlier pages on which no common ground 
seems to exist are those of "non-trade concerns" and "rebalancing."  The US and the Cairns Group appear 
to be far away from accepting that major parts of farm programs can be excluded as being subject to  a 
"higher imperative" and unwilling to see any increase in protection for oilseeds and cereal substitutes in 
the EC.  In all other areas the major negotiating countries agree on the direction they should take their 
agricultural policies and associated trade arrangements and behavior.  They have different visions about 
the ultimate destination and the most appropriate paths to follow.  But for the first time in the 4O-year 
history of the GATT,  they agree on the general direction to  be taken and  are agreed that the journey 
should begin now. 
To  be broadly  satisfactory  as  an  outcome  the  following  elements  should  appear  in  the final 
package: 
a.  A general commitment to reduce the level of  trade-distorting support and protection by at least 
the same magnitude as in the negotiations on tariff reductions.  The AMS should be used for setting the 
target and  monitoring  progress  in  this  reduction.  These reductions  should  in  principle apply  to  all 
countries and commodities equally.  Some flexibility in the policy mix and levels of adjustments may have 
to be negotiated to achieve greater harmony in protection levels and to respond to special cases.  Progress 
towards that target should be monitored through a series of annual Policy Reviews, allowing some limited 
modification of the pace of adjustment in  response to  unexpected world  market changes.  Domestic 
policies should be restructured to use less trade-distorting instruments, though the overall level of support 
given to the agri-food sector, farm people and rural areas would not itself be controlled. 
22 b.  Import barriers would be lowered by an amount at least comparable to that agreed for the 
overall level of trade-distorting support.  In addition there would be a phased conversion of non-tariff 
import barriers to tariffs.  There could be an allowance in such a conversion for some part of world 
market or exchange rate developments.  Alternatively, a special safeguard mechanism applicable for the 
transition period could be negotiated.  These new tariffs would also be subject to the common reduction 
rules,  and  the  "buffering"  component  would  be  progressively  reduced.  All  waivers  and  similar 
exemptions would be removed as a part of the reinstrumentation of import barriers. 
c.  Export subsidies would be removed or reduced by at least the same proportion as  import 
barriers.  Until such time as countries can avoid altogether the use of export subsidies, these should also 
be subject to  stronger disciplines to  establish maximum levels of such subsidies and  mandate annual 
reductions.  These disciplines could also involve an agreement not to target export subsidies at particular 
markets.  In addition, an agreement could include a decision to replace variable export subsidies with a 
fixed component tied to the bound tariff on the same items, but with the provision that such subsidies be 
reduced in annual increments and more rapidly at times of firm market prices. 
d.  Domestic subsidies should be classified into categories depending on their presumed trade-
distorting nature.  A"  green"  category would  contain those that satisfied certain agreed criteria,  and 
illustrative lists would be provided to encourage the constructive conversion of  existing programs.  These 
program would not be subject to countervailing duties.  The "amber" category would initially contain all 
other policies not specifically prohibited in the GATT.  These would be subject to a phased reduction at 
the same rate as the overall commitment.  The issue of whether any particular policy instrument should 
be placed into  a "red" category of unacceptable practices should be taken up  in the discussion of rule 
changes. 
e.  A number of specific trade issues are best dealt with as  Special Cases in the final stages of 
the negotiations.  This includes the rebalancing of EC support policy, specifically by increasing border 
protection for non-cereal feeds as a counterpart to cereal support reduction.  Limited rebalancing confined 
to the cereal substitutes may be negotiable as a part of a package, even if not on its own merits.  The so-
called "non-trade concerns" come under the same category.  Rather than make general agreements on the 
scope for protection on non-economic grounds, it is best to treat this as an issue which must be faced to 
get agreement on the broader package.  The basis for such special arrangements must, however, be the 
overall commitment on reduction of support.  Supply management (and the associated changes needed in 
Article XI) could also be treated as a special issue in specifying the obligations of countries that employ 
this technique. 
f.  In addition to the negotiated reduction of support and the reinstrumentation of domestic and 
trade policies, it is also desirable that the GAIT rules be updated to underpin this process and to reflect 
the experience with the current articles.  The major changes that are needed are: changes in Article XX 
to improve the transparency of regulations in the health and phytosanitary area; clarification of the scope 
of Article XI so as to make clear the exceptional circumstances under which non-tariff import restrictions 
are to  be permitted; improvement of the safeguards provision of the GAIT so that countries may know 
when they may  take exceptional  action;  elaboration of the exceptional  conditions under which  export 
subsidies  are  allowed;  and  improvements  in  the  disciplines  governing  the use of anti-dumping  and 
countervail duties in bilateral trade. 
g.  A  general  agreement to  allow  the developing  countries  and  the former  centrally planned 
economies to participate fully in the GAIT process without being forced to make adjustments or grant 
23 concessions  beyond what is  practical or desirable for  them.  This  should be done however without 
modification to the rules and agreements as such, but merely to the extent of their application. 
The task facing the negotiators between now and December 1990 is to extend the common ground 
so as to encompass a satisfactory outcome.  If all sides wish to see an end to the unsatisfactory conditions 
surrounding agricultural trade and the adoption of  constructive and workable rules within which domestic 
policy can operate, the task should not be impossible. 
24 Annex 1: An Illustrative Agreement 
The package to be agreed for agriculture in the Uruguay Round negotiations has to  contain a 
number of elements  relating to  the issues  discussed  in  detail  in the report.  An example of such  an 
agreement is outlined below.  This example illustrates, in a more concrete way, the general comments 
on the various issues relevant in the negotiations which have been made in the body of this report.  It 
should not be read as describing what the authors of this report would consider to be the only sensible 
or even the optimal outcome of the negotiations, but it does outline an ambitious but feasible agreement. 
1.  National agricultural policies and their accompanying trade arrangements will be reformed during 
a transition period, the first stage of which is agreed to be five years. In the fourth year, contracting 
parties will meet to agree on the need to  vary targets and procedures for the second stage of the 
reform process. 
2.  The overall level of  protection and support will be reduced from the 1986 levels by 50 percent during 
the first stage of the reform process (five years). This overall target for the reform process is to be 
expressed  in  an  AMS  form,  and  the  reduction  applies  equally  to  all  countries  and  all  policy 
instruments,  except  for  those  domestic  policies  which  have  been  designated  as  having  no,  or 
negligible,  trade effects.  It applies  to  all  agricultural  and  food  commodities  as  included  in  the 
commodity list annexed to the US  comprehensive proposal. 
3.  All tariffs on agricultural and food products will be bound and then reduced by at least 50 percent 
during the first stage, giving particular priority to the reduction of the highest tariffs. 
4.  All non-tariff import barriers, independently of their legal status, are to be converted into specific 
or ad valorem tariffs during the first year. The maximum tariff levels are the tariff equivalents of 
the  existing  import barriers on average during  the period  1986-88.  Where price-related  import 
measures (such as variable levies) contained a redundant element ('water in the tariff') during that 
reference period, the redundant element is reduced by 50 percent at the time of conversion into a 
tariff. 
5.  The newly established tariffs are to be reduced by 50 percent during the first stage, in equal annual 
steps. 
6.  During the transition period,  the newly  established tariffs  can be varied,  at the margin,  and  by 
agreement,  in' order to  offset the effects of fluctuating  world market prices.  For this  purpose,  a 
reference world market price will be fixed for each commodity and country in all those cases where 
tariffs have been newly established. The reference price is  to  be expressed in the currency of the 
country concerned (ECU in the case of the EC). The reference price will be the average cif price 
during the period  1986-88 (Le.  the same price which is used for calculating the tariff equivalent). 
When the actual world market price is above the reference price, the tariff is to be reduced by the 
full difference between the actual price and the reference price. When the actual world market price 
is below the reference price, the tariff can be increased by a given percentage of  the difference. This 
percentage is  agreed to be 90 percent in the first year, 80 percent in the second year, and so on. 
7.  Article XI:2(c)  is to be eliminated from the GAIT after an agreed transitional period.  Countries 
which so far have relied on that Article in connection with supply management programs (and have 
25 notified the GAIT of it) can establish a tariff which is twenty percent above the tariff equivalent 
defined above. However, this tariff, too, has to be reduced like all other tariffs. 
8.  Existing levels of  export subsidies per unit expressed in national currencies are to be bound, and then 
reduced by at least 50 percent during the first stage. 
9.  It is agreed that in each country export subsidies must not be higher than the level of import tariffs 
of that country for the same commodity. 
10.  In order partially to offset fluctuations of world market prices, export subsidies can be varied in the 
same way as  import tariffs over the transitional period (see No.6 above). 
11.  Article XVI:3 is to be eliminated from the GAIT (and the Subsidies Code amended accordingly). 
An interpretative note is to be added to Article XVI:4 which states that during the transition period 
countries can continue to use export subsidies on primary products, as long as these subsidies do not 
exceed their bound (and reduced) levels.  Export subsidies on processed products may not exceed 
the accounts payable on their raw product components. 
12.  The criteria for (and a list of) trade distorting domestic subsidies is to be agreed. All subsidies not 
contained in that list are considered to be not trade distorting. The list is to be reviewed annually. 
13.  Domestic subsidies which are not on the list of  trade distorting subsidies and fall outside the criteria 
will be permitted, and their level will not be constrained. 
14.  Aggregate government expenditure on trade distorting subsidies is to be bound for each country by 
commodity, and is reduced by 50 percent during the first stage, in equal annual steps. 
15.  The most trade distorting domestic subsidies (such as deficiency payments) are bound, on a per unit 
basis, in the schedules of concessions of the countries concerned. 
16.  Article XX is  amended such that consistency with sound scientific evidence and  the principle of 
equivalency  are  embodied  in  that  Article.  At  the same  time,  Article XX  is  amended  such  that 
notification requirements according to those specified in the Standards Code are introduced. 
17.  An interpretative note is added to the third sentence of Article XXIII which requires that in cases of 
disputes over sanitary and phytosanitary matters the appropriate international standards organizations 
have to be consulted. 
18.  Developing countries participating in these agreements can extend the first stage of the transition 
period to ten years. 
19.  It is agreed that commitments under the Food Aid Convention should be increased to 12 million tons 
per year.  A minimum of 50 percent of food  aid  should be provided either through  multilateral 
institutions or as development aid granted with the assistance of  multilateral institutions.  All bilateral 
food aid will be provided as grants. 
20.  A specific review process is  established in order to oversee, on an annual basis, the operation of 
these agreements during the transition period.  If a majority of the countries participating in these 
26 agreements agree, the first stage of the transition period can be extended by a maximum of three 
years. 
27 Annex ll: Possible Formulae for Modified Tariffication 
The concept of "modified tariffication" discussed in the text of the report requires some elaboration 
in order to see better how it compares with the more traditional concept of tariffication.  The analogous 
concept of modifying export subsidies is also explored. 
Tariffs 
According to the EC proposal, variable levies (and other non-tariff measures) would be replaced by 
a tariff which would consist of a 'fixed component' and a 'corrective factor in order to take into account 
exchange rate variations and world market fluctuations which went beyond certain limits to be agreed'. 
Such a modified tariff in any year t, MT(t), could be calculated according to the formula 
(1)  MT(t)  =  FC(t) + (u * DIF(t»  , 
where FC(t) is the 'fixed component' in year t, DIF(t) is the extent to which the actual world market price 
is below the 'limit to be agreed' and u is a parameter, 0 sus 1 , which determines the extent to which 
downward variations of the world market price (in ECU) would lead to an increase in the tariff. 
The separate  mention of 'world  market fluctuations'  and  'exchange rate variations'  in  the  EC 
proposal for "modified tariffication" requires that changes in world market prices be decomposed into (a) 
price changes in US dollar and (b) changes of the ECU exchange rate against the dollar.  The reasoning 
may be that exchange rate fluctuations  'have nothing to do  with agricultural support' (as argued in the 
section on the Support Measurement Unit (SMU)  in the EC proposal) while changes in world market 
conditions (supposedly reflected in dollar price variations) could be allowed to influence, to some extent, 
domestic market developments. 
This  could  be done  if the variable element  in  the  modified  tariff,  DIF(t),  were defined  by  the 
equation 
(2)  DIF(t) =  6 * [PR$ - PW$(t)] * XR + [XR - X(t)]  * PR$ + [PW$(t) - PR$] * [XR - X(t)] 
In this equation, the first term on the right hand side is the difference between the reference price 
in dollars, PR$, and the actual dollar world market price, PW$(t), multiplied by the reference exchange 
rate  XR (defined as ECU per dollar), in order to be expressed in ECU terms. The second term on the 
right hand side is the difference between the reference exchange rate and the actual exchange rate  X(t) 
(again defined as ECU per dollar), multiplied by the reference price in order to express the exchange rate 
effect on the wheat price. In order to  add up  to the actual difference between the ECU reference price 
and the ECU world market price, the cross term of the two differences also has to be included. 
Since any deviation of the actual exchange rate from its reference value would, according to the EC 
proposal, probably be allowed to be more fully  compensated (through an increase in the tariff) than a 
variation in the dollar world market price, a parameter 6, 0 s 6 s  1 , has to be included in the definition 
28 of DIF(t) in order to be able to give different weights to price variations and exchange rate fluctuations. 
In equation (2), this parameter is applied to the first term on the right hand side.21 
According to the EC proposal for "modified tariffication", the fixed component of the tariff 'would 
be reduced at a similar rate as the SMU'. In essence the reduction of FC(t) would probably mirror the 
reduction of domestic support prices which the EC would have to implement in accordance with its SMU 
commitment.22  If this reduction of the domestic price level would have to take place in equal  annual 
steps of a ECU per unit, the development of FC(t) over time could be described by a formula like 
(3)  FC(t) = FC(O) - (a  * t) , 
where FC(O) is the fixed component in the base year. 
A final  formula  would probably  have  to  deal  with  an  issue  which  is  not  mentioned  in  the  EC 
proposal, nor in other proposals for tariffication.  In periods of rising world market prices it can well 
happen that the "old" variable levy system of  the EC would lead to a lower import tax than a "new" fixed 
tariff. This would become the more likely the higher the domestic price cuts are which may result from 
the negotiations. One way of dealing with this issue would be to subtract any excess of the actual world 
market  price  in  ECU,  PWE(t),  over  an  upper  limit  level  in  ECU  terms,  PUE(t),  from  the  fixed 
component. The tariff actually applied, TA(t), would then be calculated according to 
(4)  TA(t) = min {MT(t)  ;  FC(t) - [PWE(t) - PUE(t)] } . 
The interesting feature of such formulae is that in their general form they can be used to describe 
all sorts of different import taxes. For example, the current variable levies of the EC result if FC(t) is 
set to' zero, PR$ * XR is set to the EC threshold price, and  0:  and 6 are set to one. On the other hand, 
a fixed per unit tariff results if 0:  and a are set to zero, and FC(O)  is given an appropriate fixed value. 
Export Subsidies 
In the text it was suggested that a similar arrangement could be envisaged for export subsidies.  This 
would  mean that there would be bindings  on export subsidies per unit,  where the permissible export 
subsidy would be calculated from a "fixed component" and a "corrective factor." 
In this  case,  the maximum  permissible export subsidy  in year  t,  SUB(t),  would  be calculated 
according to the formula 
(5)  SUB(t) = min { FC(t) + (0: * DIF(t»;  PI(t) - PW(t) }, 
where FC(t) is the "fixed component" in year t, DIF(t) is the extent to which the actual world market 
price differs from (in particular: is below) the "limit to be agreed"  and  0:  is a parameter, 0  S  0:  S  1, 
21  The same result could have been obtained if  such a parameter had been applied to the second term on the right hand side. 
though the parameter a  would then have to be set in a different way.  Note that with jJ  =  0 equation  (2) yields exactly the 
difference between the reference price in ECU and the actual price in ECU. 
22 Note that the new SMU proposal of  the EC also opens up the possibility of  having some variation in the external reference 
price. 
29 which determines the extent to which downward variations of the world market price (in ECU) can lead 
to an increase in the export subsidy.  The parameter  «  would have to be agreed in the negotiations.  The 
second term on the right hand side of this equation specifies the existing definition of the EC variable 
export subsidy, which essentially is the difference between the EC intervention price, PI(t) and the world 
market price in ECU, PW(t).  This traditional form of the (fully) variable export subsidy would still be 
used when the world market price exceeds that reference level below which the new (less variable) export 
subsidy would become relevant.  The reason for keeping this traditional form 
for high price periods is that otherwise the new EC export subsidy would in such periods be higher. 
By analogy with the arrangements for tariffs, the difference between the agreed reference price in 
ECU and the actual world market price, DIF(t), would have to be split up into (a) the difference between 
the reference  price  in  dollar,  PR$,  and  the  actual  dollar  world  market  price,  PW$(t),  and  (b)  the 
difference between the reference exchange rate, XR, and the actual exchange rate, X(t), both defined as 
ECU per dollar.  In order to add up to the actual difference between the ECU reference price and the 
ECU world market price, the cross term of the two differences has to be included. 
(6)  DIF(t) = 6 * [PR$ -PW$(t)] * XR  +  [XR - X(t)]  *PR$  +  [PW$(t) - PR$]  * [XR - X(t)] 
Since any deviation of the actual exchange rate from its reference value would probably be allowed 
to be more fully compensated through an increase in the permissible export subsidy than would a variation 
in the dollar world market price, a parameter 6, 0  s: 6 s:  1, has to be included in the definition of DIF(t). 
According to the EC proposal for "modified tariffication," the fixed component of the tariff would 
be reduced  in  parallel  with  the SMU.  At the same time,  the fixed  component of the bound export 
subsidy,  FC(t)  would mirror the reduction of  domestic support prices which  the EC  would  have to 
implement in accordance with its SMU commitment.  If  this reduction of the domestic price level would 
have to take place in equal annual steps of  ~ ECU per unit, the development of FC(t) over time could be 
described by a formula like 
(7)  FC(t)  =  FC(O)  - (~  * t). 
The current fully variable export subsidies of the EC can be described by these equations if FC(t) 
is set to zero, PR$ * XR is set to the EC intervention price, and  «  and  6  are set to one. 
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